Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering by Sawyer, Sarah
1 
Truth and Objectivity in Conceptual Engineering 
Sarah Sawyer, University of Sussex
s.a.sawyer@sussex.ac.uk
Forthcoming in a special issue of Inquiry on Externalism and Conceptual Change edited by 
Henry Jackman. 
1. Conceptual Engineering
Recent examples of conceptual engineering within the philosophical arena include the 
proposal by Clark and Chalmers (1998) to extend the traditional understanding of belief, the 
proposal by Haslanger (2000) to rethink our conceptions of race and gender, and the proposal 
by Scharp (2013) to reconceive the notion of truth. But there is a good sense in which all 
philosophical theorizing is at root a form of conceptual engineering, and philosophical 
attempts throughout the ages to capture the nature of knowledge, evidence, causation, 
explanation, justice, rights, emotion, consciousness, and so on, count equally as examples. 
Moreover, examples of conceptual engineering can also be found beyond the confines of 
philosophy. Indeed, much of scientific theorizing falls under the umbrella of conceptual 
engineering, as do recent proposals in the social arena to overturn the traditional conceptions 
of, for example, rape, marriage, and women, where such proposals are largely driven by the 
desire for social justice and equality. Conceptual engineering has a long history and concerns 
a wide-ranging and diverse array of topics.  
 Of late, philosophical attention has turned to the nature of conceptual engineering 
itself. What exactly is conceptual engineering? What unites the diverse array of cases? It will 
help to distinguish at the outset a broad sense of conceptual engineering from a narrow sense. 
In the broad sense, conceptual engineering is a form of theorizing that involves a proposed 
change in linguistic practice. Sometimes this can take the form of a proposal to eliminate the 
use of a term on the grounds that it is defective in some way, for example by failing to play 
the explanatory role it was intended to play (e.g. ‘phlogiston’, ‘élan vital’); sometimes it can 
take the form of a proposal to introduce a new term on the grounds that it is required for 
explanatory purposes that have not hitherto been recognized (e.g. ‘antimatter’, ‘epistemic 
entitlement’); and sometimes it can take the form of a proposal to keep a term that is 
currently in use, but to revise the current use on the grounds that this would constitute some 
kind of improvement, whether theoretical, practical or normative. Theorizing that involves a 
proposed change in linguistic practice of any of these kinds—elimination, introduction or 
revision—is conceptual engineering in the broad sense. But the paradigms of  conceptual 
engineering around which recent debate concerning the nature of conceptual engineering has 
centred are to be found in that subset of cases that involve the revised use of a term. Each of
conceptual engineering around which recent debate concerning the nature of conceptual 
engineering has centred are to be found in that subset of cases that involve the revised use of 
a term. Each of 
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the proposals mentioned at the outset of this paper falls into this category, as do ameliorative 
projects generally. These are instances of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense. 
My characterization of conceptual engineering (in both the broad and the narrow 
sense) as a form of theorizing is intended to be neutral with respect to different metasemantic 
frameworks that might be adopted in order to explain the phenomenon of conceptual 
engineering. Thus at this very general level—the level of characterization rather than 
explanation—I make no mention of concepts so as to remain neutral with respect to the 
nature of concepts, including the question of whether conceptual engineering should be 
framed in terms of concepts at all (cf. Cappelen 2018); and I make no mention of linguistic 
meaning so as to remain neutral with respect to the nature of linguistic meaning, including the 
question of whether the meaning of a term is determined by current linguistic practice, 
temporally-extended linguistic practice (cf. Jackman 1999, 2005) or something else. 
Cappelen’s alternative characterization of conceptual engineering as ‘the process of assessing 
and improving our representational devices’ (Cappelen, 2018: 3), being non-committal with 
respect to the nature of the representational devices in play, is also relatively neutral in this 
regard. However, the characterization nonetheless presupposes that at least some 
representational devices are the kinds of things that can or should be assessed and improved, 
and this turns out to be controversial, particularly with respect to the central, revisionary 
cases (cf. Ball 2019). Moreover, those who advocate understanding concepts in terms of 
functions appear to reject the claim that the function of a concept is fundamentally 
representational. If this is right, then the claim that conceptual engineering concerns 
specifically representational devices is also controversial. (For accounts that appeal to a 
concept’s functions see for example Haslanger 2000, Brigandt 2010, Prinzing 2018, Nado 
2019 and Thomasson Forthcoming.) I prefer to think of conceptual engineering as a form of 
theorizing, and build a case in favour of this characterization—beyond that of metasemantic 
neutrality—as we proceed.   
Focussing on the paradigm cases, I have said that conceptual engineering in the 
narrow sense is a form of theorizing that involves a proposal to revise the current use of a 
term on the grounds that this would constitute a theoretical, practical or normative 
improvement. A proposal to revise the current use of a term can (with a little idealization) be 
explicitly stated as a revisionary analysis of the term in question. The analysis of a term is 
revisionary if it specifies conditions that have to be met in order for an object, process or 
event to fall into the extension of the term, where the specified conditions differ from the 
conditions that have been traditionally, or are standardly, associated with the term. The 
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conditions that have to be met in order for an object, process or event to fall into the 
extension of a term can be thought of as providing the meaning, or intension of the relevant 
term. Thus, departing from the aforementioned metasemantic neutrality, a proposal to revise 
the current use of a term can be understood as an attempt to assign the term a revised 
meaning, or revised intension. (This understanding is inconsistent with temporal externalism, 
but I leave further discussion of the view until section 4 below.) Assigning a term a revised 
meaning or revised intension opens up the possibility of a change in the term’s extension, 
since the set of objects, processes or events that satisfy the conditions specified by the 
revisionary analysis may differ from the set of objects, processes or events that satisfy the 
conditions traditionally, or standardly associated with the term. Indeed, a revisionary analysis 
is sometimes proposed precisely in order to eliminate what is perceived to be a discrepancy 
between the extension of the term as it is currently used and the extension of the term as it 
ought to be used. To take an example, the traditional extension of the term ‘belief’ was 
assumed to be restricted to states that occurred entirely within the confines of the individual 
thinker, whereas, according to the revisionary analysis, some states that extend beyond the 
confines of the individual thinker should also be classified as beliefs. Similarly, the 
traditional extension of the term ‘woman’ was assumed to include all and only adult human 
females, whereas, according to the revisionary analysis, some biological males should also be 
classified as women, and some adult human females should not be so classified. A 
revisionary analysis thus departs from standard usage and belief. 
But a crucial aspect of such cases is that both those who advocate in favour of the 
proposed revisionary analysis and those who resist are, and typically take themselves to be, 
talking and disagreeing about a shared topic: belief, gender, race, truth, rape, marriage, 
women. Thus conceptual engineering narrowly construed essentially involves topic 
preservation through semantic change. This is what separates such cases from cases involving 
‘mere semantic drift’. In cases of mere semantic drift, the use of a term changes gradually 
over time, but the subject matter changes gradually over time in accordance with the gradual 
change in use. Mere semantic drift is exemplified by vast numbers of terms including ‘meat’, 
‘wicked’, ‘egregious’ and ‘awesome’. These terms no longer mean what they once did; but 
nor do they allow us to talk about the same subject matter. A revisionary analysis, in contrast, 
provides, at the same time as advocating a change in the use of a term, a revisionary 
understanding of the relevant phenomenon, where the phenomenon in question is identified 
by use of the term both before and after the variation in its intension and extension. 
4 
Since conceptual engineering narrowly construed essentially involves topic 
preservation through semantic change, a metasemantic framework adequate to explaining the 
phenomenon of conceptual engineering must be able to answer the question of how this is 
possible. This is known variously as the continuity problem, the discontinuity problem and 
Strawson’s Challenge, after the objection raised in Strawson (1963) against the account of 
conceptual explication given in Carnap (1950). According to Strawson, ‘typical philosophical 
problems about the concepts used in non-scientific discourse cannot be solved by laying 
down the rules of exact and fruitful concepts in science. To do this last is not to solve the 
typical philosophical problem, but to change the subject’ (Strawson 1963: 506). Strawson’s 
Challenge as it is discussed in the literature on conceptual engineering is a broadening of 
Strawson’s specific concern about the replacement of non-scientific (philosophical) terms 
with scientific terms. The broader concern is how there can be topic preservation through 
semantic change. 
The pressing nature of the question, and the apparent difficulty of providing a 
satisfactory answer, in part explains why recent debate surrounding conceptual engineering 
has centred on these cases (cf. Cappelen 2018, where the problem takes centre stage and 
which documents the presence of the concern in the literature). The difficulty can be seen in 
its starkest form if we make the false, but not-unreasonable assumption that the extension of a 
term delineates a topic about which the term allows us to talk. If extensions and topics are 
connected (that is, identified) in this way, then a change in extension of the kind that typically 
follows from the adoption of a revisionary analysis will ipso facto bring about a change in 
topic. The problem, then, is that there is no sense to be made of conceptual engineering in the 
narrow sense within a metasemantic framework according to which the extension of a term 
delineates a topic. But the problem runs deeper. Responding to Strawson’s challenge requires 
a metasemantic framework that not only separates extensions from topics in such a way as to 
allow a change in the former without a change in the latter, but one that separates them in the 
radical sense of allowing a term to concern the very same topic at two times, t1 and t2, 
despite there being no overlap at all between the extension of the term at t1 and the extension 
of the term at t2. This is because examples of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense 
include cases where the adoption of the revisionary analysis would have the effect of 
changing the conditions associated with the term from inconsistent to consistent, and 
(although this doesn’t follow of necessity) of changing the extension of the term from empty 
to non-empty. Indeed, the intention of achieving this result is precisely what motivates certain 
cases of revisionary analysis. Scharp’s revisionary analysis of ‘truth’ is a case in point (cf. 
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Scharp 2013).1 Even if we reject, as I think we should, Scharp’s further claim that 
‘philosophy is, for the most part, the study of inconsistent concepts’ (Scharp 2013: 3), such 
cases provide central examples of conceptual engineering and cannot be set aside as 
anomalies.  
In a series of articles (Sawyer 2018, Forthcoming a, Forthcoming b), I have offered a 
response to Strawson’s challenge by drawing on an externalist metasemantic framework that 
distinguishes language from thought. The framework countenances two semantic elements—
the meaning, or intension of a term, which connects the term to an extension, and the concept 
expressed by a term, which connects the term to a topic. The meaning of a term is determined 
by communal linguistic practice, which can change over time resulting in a change in both 
the intension and the extension of the term. In a certain range of cases, the concept expressed 
by a term is, in contrast, determined by non-conceptual relations between thinkers and 
objective properties. In this range of cases, objective properties contribute to the 
determination of our concepts and constitute the stable topics about which we talk and think. 
The distinction between language and thought thus provides a response to Strawson’s 
challenge by explaining how topic preservation through semantic change is possible: under 
certain circumstances, the concept expressed by a term remains constant while the linguistic 
practice surrounding the use of the term changes to reflect different understandings of what 
is, and is represented conceptually as, a single topic.  
My response depends on the realist assumption that there are objective properties to 
which we stand in non-conceptual relations and that in certain cases it is such objective 
properties that both determine our concepts and constitute the topics about which we talk and 
think. This realist assumption is a familiar and fundamental presupposition of an anti-
individualistic understanding of mental representation (cf. Putnam 1973, Burge 1979, 1986). 
It is, however, more controversial with respect to social kinds and artefact kinds, both of 
which depend in some way on our mental states and linguistic practices (cf. Searle 1995, 
Hacking 1999, Epstein 2015) than it is with respect to natural kinds, which it is plausible to 
think exist independently of our mental states and linguistic practices. Dependence on mental 
states and linguistic practices might be thought to threaten the kind of objectivity that my 
account invokes to explain topic preservation through semantic change. The first aim of the 
1 Scharp himself sees this as the replacement of one concept with another, but this is in part because he thinks of 
concepts as having constitutive principles. As will become clear from the discussion below, I think talk of 
constitutive principles should be rejected, and talk of the replacement of one concept of truth for another should 
be reconstrued in terms of the replacement of one theory of truth for another.  
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current paper is to show that my response to Strawson’s Challenge has a wider application 
than might be thought, applying to terms for natural kinds, philosophical kinds, social kinds 
and artefact kinds. A significant range of terms in each of these categories express concepts 
that represent properties that are objective in the relevant sense of exhibiting stability through 
changes in beliefs and associated linguistic practice. The second aim of the paper is to show 
that the revisionary analysis of such terms cannot be adequately explained without appeal to 
the distinction between language and thought.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I elaborate the externalist 
account of concepts in play. In particular, I explain the externalist distinction between 
concepts and conceptions, and I suggest that it is often conceptions rather than concepts that 
are engineered in the process of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense. In section 3, I 
run through a series of examples to support my claim that revisionary analyses of the kind 
central to projects in conceptual engineering concern topics which are constituted by 
objective properties in the relevant sense. In section 4, I argue against two rival externalist 
metasemantic frameworks, each of which attempts to explain topic preservation through 
semantic change without appeal to the distinction between language and thought. These are 
given respectively in Cappelen (2018) and Ball (Forthcoming). I argue that, for different 
reasons, neither provides an adequate account of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense. 
This is ultimately because of an assumption, implicit in the first and explicit in the second, 
that the linguistic practice surrounding the use of a term determines the nature of the property 
represented. I conclude briefly in section 5. 
 
2. Concepts in Conceptual Engineering 
Central to an externalist metasemantic framework is a distinction between concepts and 
conceptions. Concepts are mental representations that are constituents of thoughts. 
Conceptions, in contrast, are sets of beliefs. Specifically, the set of beliefs a subject associates 
with a concept is her conception of the subject matter that her concept represents. Since, 
according to externalism, concept-possession is determined in part by non-conceptual 
relations to objective properties and is not determined by conceptions, two individuals can 
possess the very same concept and yet have different associated conceptions.2 Burge’s 
                                                           
2 Conversely, two individuals can associate the same conception with different concepts. For example, 
reinterpreting Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment as having implications for thought rather than language, 
Oscar and Twin Oscar can be understood as possessing different concepts—the concepts water and twater 
respectively—despite the identity of their associated conceptions. See Putnam (1973) for the original Twin 
Earth thought experiment as applied to the nature of language. 
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example of Alf, Alf’s doctor and the concept arthritis provides a clear example (cf. Burge 
1979). Alf and his doctor are assumed to possess the very same concept, arthritis, despite 
having different associated conceptions of arthritis. Alf believes (incorrectly) that arthritis can 
occur in the muscles as well as in the joints, which in part explains why he believes the 
arthritis in his knee has spread to his thigh; Alf’s doctor, in contrast, believes (correctly) that 
arthritis can only occur in the joints, which is why he goes on to explain to Alf that the pain 
in his thigh could not be arthritis. Despite the fact that their associated conceptions of arthritis 
differ, each of their beliefs nonetheless involves the concept arthritis: Alf believes that 
arthritis can occur in the muscles; Alf’s doctor believes that arthritis cannot occur in the 
muscles. And it is because their beliefs involve the same concept that their disagreement 
counts as a genuine disagreement about arthritis.  
The claim that two individuals can possess the same concept and yet have different 
associated conceptions goes hand in hand with the claim that an individual can possess a 
concept even though her associated conception is vague or inaccurate. This is the sense in 
which a subject can be said to have an incomplete, or partial grasp of a concept. Possession of 
a concept is one thing; full grasp of a concept is another. The extent to which a subject grasps 
a concept depends in complex ways on two primary factors—her capacity for correct 
deployment of the concept across a range of contexts, and the truth of her associated 
conception. But given that concept-possession is determined by non-conceptual relations to 
objective properties and independently of conceptions, the extent to which a subject’s 
conception of a given subject matter can be wrong is almost limitless. Thus, for example, it is 
possible to possess the concepts cat, physical object and moral obligation, while nonetheless 
believing that cats are robots, that physical objects are ideas in the mind of God, and that 
one’s only moral obligation is to oneself. There are no ‘core commitments’ associated with 
words that cannot be given up; there are no ‘constitutive principles’ grasp of which are 
essential for concept-possession (contra, for example, Peacocke 1992).  
Moreover, just as it is possible for an individual to be radically mistaken about a given 
subject matter, it is, in many cases, possible for the community as a whole to be radically 
mistaken about a given subject matter. Thus what we might call a ‘communal conception’, 
understood as the set of beliefs that constitute the predominant theory of the relevant subject 
matter in the community—the ‘received view’, as it were—is also, in many cases, subject to 
error and open to correction. It is possible, that is, for a given concept to be widely possessed 
in the community and yet for no-one to grasp that concept fully. (Cf. Burge 1986, but also 
Burge 2005, where the origins of the distinction between complete and incomplete grasp of a 
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concept are traced to Frege’s work on the concept of number, for which see Frege 1884. A 
similar point is made in Williamson 2007 and endorsed under the title ‘Anti-Creed’ in 
Cappelen 2018: 63). The possibility of the community as a whole being mistaken about the 
nature of a property or kind reflects a level of objectivity in the property or kind sufficient to 
ground the possibility of topic preservation through semantic change. Linguistic meanings 
(and hence communal conceptions) are determined by agreement, but concepts are not.  
The distinction between concepts and conceptions provides an alternative framework 
within which to understand the revisionary analyses central to the paradigms of conceptual 
engineering. I said in section 1 above that the analysis of a term is revisionary if it specifies 
conditions that have to be met in order for an object, process or event to fall into the 
extension of the term, where the specified conditions differ from the conditions that have 
been traditionally, or are standardly, associated with the term. The difference between the 
conditions traditionally associated with the term and the conditions the revisionary analysis 
associates with the term can be understood as encapsulating different conceptions of the same 
subject matter. This accords with Ball’s claim that certain proposals for revisionary analyses 
are ‘best formulated in terms of competing analyses (rather than in terms of competing 
concepts)’ (Ball Forthcoming: 3). In light of this, the proposal to extend the traditional 
understanding of belief can be understood, in effect, as the proposal of a new theory about the 
nature of belief. Similarly, the proposal to reconceive the notion of truth can be understood, 
in effect, as the proposal of a new theory about the nature of truth. Thus the externalist 
distinction between concepts and conceptions supports my initial characterization of 
conceptual engineering in the narrow sense as a form of theorizing that involves a revision in 
the use of a term. It also affords an understanding of the claim, common in the literature, that 
the conceptual engineer aims to offer a conceptual improvement, since a revisionary analysis 
constitutes an attempt to provide a more accurate characterization, or theory, of the subject 
matter represented by the concept. Of course, given the possibility of radically false 
communal conceptions, there is no guarantee that a revisionary analysis will in fact provide a 
more accurate characterization of the subject matter represented by the concept, let alone that 
it will provide the correct theory of the relevant subject matter. The possibility of future 
revision remains forever open. But improvement, measured in terms of truth, is the aim. This 
contrasts with an anti-truth sentiment that runs through strands of the conceptual engineering 
literature, particularly evident in discussions of social kinds and in accounts of conceptual 
engineering that appeal to continuity in a concept’s so-called ‘functions’. Nado expresses the 
sentiment when she says: ‘Conceptual efficacy is the chief aim of philosophy; truth and 
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knowledge, by contrast, are secondary aims at best’ (Nado 2019: 4). It is also the point at 
which Ball and I part company. I return to this issue below. 
Note that the distinction between concepts and conceptions tells against the prevalent 
claim that conceptual engineering involves fixing defective concepts, and thus avoids the 
question of how a concept which has its representational properties essentially could be 
revised. In section 1, I characterized conceptual engineering in the broad sense as a form of 
theorizing that involves a proposed change in linguistic practice, whether that be the 
elimination, introduction or revision of a term. Let us briefly consider each of these in turn. 
The elimination of a term from the language can sometimes be motivated by recognition of 
the fact that it fails to denote a property that was originally hypothesized to exist. In so far as 
a term eliminated on these grounds can be said to express a concept, it can reasonably be 
thought of as defective in the sense of being empty, but a concept that is defective in this 
sense is discarded rather than fixed. Terms such as ‘phlogiston’ and ‘élan vital’ provide 
examples of this kind. Conversely, the introduction of a term into the language can 
sometimes be motivated by the discovery of a hitherto-undiscovered property. Such cases 
involve the introduction of a new term to express a concept that represents the newly-
discovered property, but although this might be thought of as fixing a conceptual system 
which is defective as a whole—defective on the grounds that it did not contain a concept 
capable of representing the property in question—such cases do not involve defective 
concepts, and no concept is fixed in the process. ‘Anti-matter’ and ‘epistemic entitlement’ 
provide recent examples of this kind. Finally, a revisionary case is often best understood 
neither in terms of a defective concept that is eliminated nor in terms of a defective 
conceptual system that is enhanced. Rather, the defect in a revisionary case often lies 
squarely in the associated communal conception. Talk of inconsistent concepts in the 
revisionary context, then (cf. Eklund 2002, Spicer 2008, Scharp 2013), should at least 
sometimes be reconstrued in terms of inconsistent conceptions. It is sometimes the belief that 
the received theory is incorrect that leads to the proposed revisionary analysis, one that 
involves the very same concept but encapsulates a different associated conception. ‘Belief’, 
‘woman’, ‘truth’ and so on provide examples of this kind.  
Moreover, once we reject the claim that conceptual engineering involves fixing 
defective concepts, there is no need to invoke a concept’s functions, purposes or aims in 
order to secure continuity through semantic change in the general case, although it may still 
be appropriate in certain cases. Appeal to some aspect of a concept’s function has been a 
popular strategy for responding to the concern that underlies Strawson’s challenge. Thus 
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Haslanger maintains that semantic change is justified ‘if central functions of the term remain 
the same, e.g., if it helps to organize or explain a core set of phenomena that the ordinary 
terms are used to identify or describe’ (Haslanger 2000: 35); Brigandt maintains that the 
epistemic goal of a concept, understood in terms of ‘the kinds of inferences and explanations 
that the concept is intended to support’ (Brigandt 2010: 24) explains the rationality of the 
semantic change surrounding biological terms such as ‘gene’; Prinzing (2018) claims that 
topic preservation can be secured by appeal to the preservation of a concept’s function, where 
this is marked out by preservation of the concept’s ‘essential features’; and Thomasson says 
that ‘appealing to function provides a promising way of giving a sense in which we remain on 
topic across change in intension and extension’ (Thomasson Forthcoming: 7).3 But while 
appeal to a concept’s function may in some cases be illuminating, appeal to a concept’s 
function cannot explain topic preservation through semantic change across the board. This is 
because a concept’s capacity to organize or explain a core set of phenomena, or to fulfil its 
epistemic goal, often depends primarily on whether it represents an objective property that is 
instantiated by the relevant core examples. Moreover, the only essential feature of a concept 
is often its representational content. I leave detailed analysis of such accounts to another 
occasion, but I share Cappelen’s pessimism about their prospects in the general case (cf. 
Cappelen 2018, chpt. 16). For now, it is sufficient to note that the distinction I have drawn 
between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept it expresses, and the corollary 
distinction between concepts and conceptions, provides an explanation of topic preservation 
through semantic change without appeal to a concept’s function. 
 
3. The Objectivity of Topics in Revisionary Analyses 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1973), in which physical doppelgängers 
Oscar and Twin Oscar are related to superficially identical but fundamentally different 
natural kinds—water and twin water respectively—has played a significant role in the current 
widespread acceptance of externalist theories of language, and, following the developments 
in Burge (1979), in the current widespread acceptance of externalist theories of thought. The 
Twin Earth thought experiment presupposes the existence of objective natural kinds to which 
we are causally related and about which our theories, and hence associated conceptions, may 
                                                           
3 Nado (2019) also endorses a functional account of concepts, which she calls ‘radical functionalism’. 
According to Nado, continuity of function is all-important, and conceptual engineering need not involve topic 
preservation at all. This is consistent with what I have said given the distinction I have drawn between 
conceptual engineering in the broad sense, examples of which Nado uses to support her claim, and conceptual 
engineering in the narrow sense, which essentially involves topic preservation.  
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be incomplete, or even fundamentally mistaken. The thought experiment seeks to establish 
the fact that it is, in such cases, causal relations rather than associated conceptions that 
determine our concepts. Kripke’s discussion of tigers and gold highlights what is essentially 
the same, anti-descriptivist point, namely that what natural kind terms allow us to talk and 
think about is not determined by our theories, which may be fundamentally mistaken, but by 
our causal connections to instances of the kinds in question (Kripke 1972). Thus Kripke 
describes a scenario in which the characterization of a tiger as ‘ ... “a large carnivorous 
quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in colour with blackish transverse stripes and white belly,” 
(derived from the entry under ‘tiger’ in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary)’ (Kripke, 
1972: 119) is radically misguided, being based on observations of tigers in non-optimal 
conditions which masked their true nature as shy, three-legged herbivores. Discovery of the 
empirical error would lead to a revised characterization, a revised dictionary entry and a 
revised communal conception; but, crucially, the concept would remain constant throughout 
the revisions, as would the topic—tigers. Revisions to theories of such natural kinds thus 
exhibit topic preservation through semantic change.4 Such natural kind terms are, as a result, 
subject to revisionary analysis in the sense described above.  
The role of demonstratively-given examples is fundamental to such cases. Kripke 
says, ‘the original concept ... is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by 
paradigmatic instances’ (Kripke 1972: 122, original emphasis). The underlying point does not 
depend on Kripke’s portrayal of the concept as itself demonstrative, which we should not 
take too seriously; similarly for Putnam’s claim that ‘words like “water” have an unnoticed 
indexical component’ (Putnam 1973: 710). The underlying point is that it is the direct 
connection to paradigm examples, unmediated by associated beliefs, that allows the concept 
to represent the stable objective property that it does. The importance of demonstratively-
given examples to thought and language is also emphasised throughout Burge’s work. For 
example, in his (1977) he argues for the fundamental nature of de re belief to language, 
thought and knowledge; and in his (1986) he emphasises the role of examples, given both 
perceptually and imaginatively, to the determination of linguistic meaning. 
This is not to say, of course, that the range of examples taken to instantiate a property 
cannot itself be mistaken; on the contrary, the range of examples taken to instantiate a given 
natural kind property is itself subject to revision. However, revised judgements about 
                                                           
4 Kripke does not distinguish the meaning of a term from the concept expressed by the term, but talks 
indiscriminately of both. As should be clear, I agree with the fundamental point as related to concepts but take 
the change in theory to mark a change in meaning. 
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particular examples are significantly constrained in a way that revised associated conceptions 
are not. Thus a piece of fool’s gold might initially have been counted as a piece of gold, but if 
the paradigm examples had included no gold, or had not been predominantly examples of 
gold, it is not clear that the concept would have been a concept of gold at all. It is the causal 
constraint on concept-possession that places the constraint on the extent of possible revision 
with respect to paradigm examples. It is also worth noting, however, that despite the 
fundamental role of demonstratively-given examples in concept-determination, the use of a 
natural kind term in empirical explanations and predictions is typically governed by 
surrounding theoretical commitments. As a result, the efficacy of empirical explanations and 
predictions depends not only on having concepts that track natural kinds, but in large measure 
also on the accuracy of the associated conceptions. It is no surprise that predictions of 
hurricanes have improved since we have come to know more about the causes and nature of 
hurricanes—but it is hurricanes we were thinking about all along.  
The considerations above apply equally to a range of philosophical terms, such as 
‘colour’, ‘number’, ‘emotion’, ‘consciousness’, ‘person’, ‘physical object’, ‘validity’ and 
‘truth’. There are concrete examples of each of these, and it is through causal relations to 
such concrete examples that we acquire concepts that represent the objective properties they 
instantiate. But causal relations to concrete examples do not reveal the true nature of the 
properties instantiated. As such, our theories of such properties may be fundamentally 
mistaken; disagreements about whether colours are mind-dependent, whether numbers are 
sets, whether emotions are beliefs, and so on, are, respectively, disagreements about the 
nature of colours, numbers and emotions. The entrenched nature of philosophical 
disagreement in certain cases highlights the fact that competing characterizations of kinds or 
properties are possible in the absence of a settled linguistic meaning. A revisionary analysis 
need not, then, be a rival to a traditional, or standard view, but can be one amongst several 
competing characterizations. Nonetheless, a revisionary analysis will constitute an 
improvement if it better captures the nature of the relevant property. Moreover, the very fact 
that the disagreements are disagreements over the nature of the properties concerned is 
sufficient to establish that concepts are not determined by associated conceptions, but by 
causal relations to objective properties. Such concepts can be widely possessed in the 
community but not fully grasped by anyone. 
The considerations surrounding natural kind terms apply even more directly to a wide 
range of social kind terms. Social kinds are, it is reasonable to assume, dependent in some 
sense on our linguistic practices and mental states. They are, one might say, socially 
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constructed, relying for their existence on contingent facts about our social relations. But they 
are not, for all that, stipulated into existence, and their nature is neither transparent to us nor 
determined by us. On the contrary, they are objective kinds, open to empirical investigation 
in much the same way that natural kinds are. The purpose of the social sciences is arguably to 
study such kinds, and to offer explanatory and predictive theories about them. Social class, 
for example, is a complex social phenomenon, thought to be determined by a number of 
socioeconomic factors, primarily income, wealth, education and occupation, and thought to 
have a significant impact on things such as physical health, life expectancy, and the prospects 
of one’s children. The nature of social class, and its causes and effects, are not stipulated but 
discovered. Similarly, it is a significant empirical discovery that race is not, as once thought, 
a biological category, and that it affects, in either a positive or a negative way, one’s capacity 
to enter the professional workforce, the probability that one will suffer life-long systematic 
discrimination, and one’s physical and mental health. The same can be said of warfare, 
poverty, crime, punishment, gender, and so on: their natures are not stipulated but discovered. 
Theories of social kinds are thus subject to error and to subsequent revision, where such 
revisions constitute improvements in so far as they better capture the nature of the kinds in 
question. But here too it is possible for the community as a whole to be mistaken about the 
nature of social kinds. This reflects a level of objectivity sufficient to ground the distinction 
between social kind concepts and our conceptions of the social kinds they represent, and it 
establishes that the former are not determined by the latter.5 Similar considerations apply to 
terms for artefacts, which also depend in some sense on our mental states, linguistic practices 
and social interactions. (Cf. Burge 1986, in which the distinction between thought and 
linguistic practice is illustrated with reference to the term ‘sofa’. See also Sawyer 
Forthcoming b.)  
In each of these categories, some terms are further removed from paradigm 
demonstratively-given examples than others. Natural kind terms such as ‘quark’, ‘gravity’ 
and ‘gene’, philosophical terms such as ‘concept’, ‘haecceity’ and ‘supervenience’, and social 
terms such as ‘collective intentionality’, ‘ideology’ and ‘modernity’ provide examples. It 
might be tempting to focus on the role of surrounding theoretical beliefs in the introduction of 
such terms, and hence treat such terms as in some sense ‘purely descriptive’, and hence either 
not subject to revisionary analysis, or subject to revisionary analysis understood along 
                                                           
5 Social terms also often have a moral dimension. If some form of moral realism is true, which I think it is, we 
have reason to revise our understanding of social kinds so that we do not act in contravention of the moral facts. 
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different lines. However, the connection to what is demonstratively given provides an anchor 
to the observable world, lending some plausibility to the claim that even revisions to theories 
of unobservable kinds can sometimes exhibit topic preservation through semantic change of 
the kind I have been advocating. Thus it is plausible to think of the discovery that neutrinos 
oscillate between three different ‘flavours’ as they travel—electron, muon and tau—and are 
thus not massless, as once thought, but instead have an immeasurably tiny mass, as a 
discovery about neutrinos. This requires thinking of the discovery as leading to a revised 
communal conception associated with a stable concept capable of securing topic preservation 
through semantic change. Two points favour the realist interpretation. First, although the 
possibility of reference-failure may increase as our terms are more theoretically-infected 
because further removed from demonstratively-given paradigm examples, the possibility of 
reference-failure is nonetheless present even at the most basic level. Just as it turned out that 
there was no phlogiston, it may have turned out that there were no tigers, not in the 
(illegitimate) sense that there were no creatures satisfying the specified conditions, but in the 
sense that there were no creatures responsible for our observations. The possibility of 
reference-failure, then, does not in and of itself undermine the objectivity of the properties 
referred to by the terms in a given category. Second, the descriptivist interpretation arguably 
involves a commitment to scientific anti-realism, which, given its descriptivist roots, looks to 
be inconsistent with the realist assumptions underlying the externalist view.6 There is no 
principled reason, then, to think that the kinds of terms that exhibit topic preservation through 
semantic change need be restricted to terms that have demonstratively-given examples, so 
long as the kinds of cases that involve demonstratively-given examples are seen as primary 
and fundamental to higher-level theoretical thought.7 
It is common in the literature to distinguish conceptual engineering from other forms 
of theorizing, contrasting it both with empirical, scientific theorizing and with the traditional 
philosophical endeavour of conceptual analysis. Given my understanding of conceptual 
engineering, it should be clear that I reject the former contrast. I also reject the latter. Nado 
captures the widely-assumed contrast when she says: ‘Conceptual engineers aim to improve 
                                                           
6 Externalism is clearly inconsistent with the scientific anti-realism of the logical positivist era, which is 
descriptivist through and through. Although I do not have the space to develop the argument here, there is 
reason to think that externalism is also inconsistent with the kind of scientific anti-realism found in van Fraassen 
(1980, 1989). 
7 Sometimes we improve our incomplete understanding of a messy world by creating precise models which we 
can understand completely but which do not represent the world accurately. I do not have the space to explore 
this issue here, but note that the phenomenon occurs both in philosophy and in science. For example, with 
respect to philosophy this is one way to understand Carnap (1950) on explication, and for the claim that 
scientific laws do not represent the regularities that occur in the physical world see Cartwright (1983). 
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or replace rather than to analyse; to create rather than to discover. While conceptual analysts 
are interested in the concepts we do have, conceptual engineers are interested in the concepts 
we ought to have. The project is prescriptive rather than descriptive.’ (Nado 2019: 3, original 
emphasis). If I am right, however, there is no substantial difference between conceptual 
analysis and conceptual engineering. Conceptual analysis was never literally an analysis of 
concepts—it was always an attempt to understand the nature of, for example, knowledge, 
evidence, causation, explanation, justice, rights, emotion, consciousness, truth, even if it was 
not understood as such. Similarly, conceptual engineering is not literally the engineering of 
concepts—it is equally an attempt to understand the nature of knowledge, evidence, 
causation, explanation, justice, rights, emotion, consciousness, truth, even if it is not 
generally understood as such. Moreover, conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering are 
alike interested in the concepts we do have and the concepts we ought to have—in improving 
and replacing as well as in analysing. The distinction between conceptual engineering in the 
broad sense and conceptual engineering in the narrow sense helps to make this clear.  
In a more speculative spirit, the label ‘conceptual analysis’ may have been used, at 
one time, with the intention of distinguishing philosophy from science by appeal to an alleged 
distinction between conceptual matters and empirical matters, where the former were to be 
investigated by an appeal to meaning, and the latter were to be investigated by appeal to 
empirical observation. But the alleged distinctions were called into question by Quine’s 
insight that there is no separating truths of meaning from matters of fact (cf. Quine 1951). 
Quine’s insight informs Burge’s account of meaning, according to which a statement of 
meaning is inextricably connected to what the community takes to be a statement of the facts 
(cf. Burge 1986). It also informs my account of revisionary analysis, according to which it 
involves both a change in the use, and hence meaning, of a term, and, at the same time, offers 
a revisionary understanding of the relevant subject matter. But it is the further realization that 
we can err in what we take the facts to be that leads Burge to draw the crucial distinction 
between thought and language that I endorse (cf. Burge 1986). When we state what we take 
the facts to be, we are responsible to the nature of the facts themselves. We can go wrong not 
just individually but collectively. This is the sense in which we are guided by norms that go 
beyond actual linguistic practice, and hence by norms that go beyond not just individual but 
communal conceptions.  
 
4. Topics and Linguistic Practice 
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I have argued that conceptual engineering in the narrow sense is to be explained by appeal to 
the externalist distinction between concepts and conceptions. In particular, if a concept is 
determined by non-conceptual relations to an objective property, rather than by associated 
communal conceptions, topic preservation through semantic change will be possible. The 
level of objectivity required for topic preservation through semantic change is guaranteed by 
the mere possibility of collective error; it does not depend on a stronger level of objectivity, 
such as mind-independence or independence from linguistic or social practice more 
generally. Moreover, the requisite level of objectivity is, I have argued, exhibited not only by 
natural kinds, but also by a wide range of philosophical kinds, social kinds and artefactual 
kinds. In this section, I argue against two rival externalist metasemantic frameworks, each of 
which offers an alternative explanation of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense. The 
first is the ‘worldly construal’ of conceptual engineering given in Cappelen (2018); the 
second is the account of conceptual engineering offered in Ball (Forthcoming), inspired by 
temporal externalism as proposed and defended in Jackman (1999, 2005). I briefly look at 
each in turn. 
Cappelen endorses what he calls ‘the worldliness of conceptual engineering’, 
according to which the process of conceptual engineering changes not only the intensions and 
extensions of our terms, but also the world. He says: ‘On this view, an instance of successful 
conceptual engineering, e.g. of ‘person’, has the result that what a person is has changed’ 
(Cappelen 2018:46). I have argued elsewhere that Cappelen’s account of conceptual 
engineering fails to explain the possibility of topic preservation through semantic change (cf. 
Sawyer Forthcoming b). Since, according to Cappelen, conceptual engineering changes what 
a person is by changing the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for an object to fall 
into the extension of the term ‘person’, the property of being a person is not a stable objective 
property that exists independently of the conditions associated with the term ‘person’. The 
worldly construal of conceptual engineering thereby undermines topic preservation by 
eradicating the possibility of a single topic—persons, for example—that persists throughout 
the change. Note that Cappelen does not confine his claims to social terms, which some 
might find plausible, but goes on to say: ‘I think this ‘worldly’ description is the correct way 
to describe all instances of conceptual engineering, not just in the social domain’ (Cappelen 
2018: 46), mentioning specifically its application to natural kind terms. This means that, for 
example, if we were to discover, as in Kripke’s hypothetical scenario, that tigers are in fact 
shy, three-legged herbivores, and we adopt a revisionary analysis of the term ‘tiger’ to reflect 
this discovery, we would have changed the nature of tigers. This implication is highly 
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counter-intuitive. But more importantly for present purposes, we are now in a position to see 
how antithetical to externalism the view is.  
To think that a change in the conditions associated with the term ‘tiger’ could bring 
about a change in the nature of tigers, is to embrace a descriptivist theory of reference 
according to which what we talk and think about depends on descriptions we have in mind. It 
is precisely this kind of descriptivist account of reference that the externalist theories of 
Putnam, Kripke and Burge were intended to overturn. Note that Kripke’s claim is not merely 
that the description an individual associates with the term ‘tiger’ might be false, but that the 
description the community as a whole associates with the term ‘tiger’ might be false. This is 
evident from his appeal to the dictionary definition of ‘tiger’. The externalist insight is that 
our capacity to think and talk about objective properties—indeed, our capacity for 
representation per se—depends on our non-conceptual relations to objective properties about 
which we may be collectively mistaken. The claim that the process of conceptual engineering 
changes the nature of tigers reverses the direction of the determination-relation that the 
externalist advocates; it makes the nature of tigers dependent on our conceptions rather than 
our concepts dependent on the nature of tigers. But tigers are what they are, and are not made 
so by any agreement we may collectively reach. The descriptivist approach undermines the 
objectivity of the properties referred to by our terms. 
The same descriptivist reversal of the determination-relation is an unwelcome 
implication of the account of conceptual engineering advocated by Ball (Forthcoming). Ball 
maintains, first, that we should not treat revisionary analyses as if they change the subject. 
Subject-change views, he says ‘cannot explain our argumentative practice: [they] cannot 
make sense of the kinds of arguments we offer, and the way we respond to these arguments’ 
(Ball, Forthcoming: 4). I agree, and this claim accords with my characterization of 
revisionary analyses as involving topic preservation through semantic change. However, Ball 
also maintains, second, that revisionary analyses do not involve semantic change. Drawing on 
work on temporal externalism (cf. Jackman 1999, 2005), Ball claims that ‘our theoretical 
activity shapes what we mean, but it does so not by making us mean something new, but by 
shaping what we meant all along’ (Ball, Forthcoming: 3). A successful revisionary analysis—
successful in the sense of being accepted by the community after debate and reflection—is, 
on this view, a retrospective stipulation of meaning. He says: ‘the key to understanding 
revisionary analyses is that they involve stipulation that (partially) fixes the meaning of prior 
uses of the word: in this kind of case, first we go about using a word, then later we make the 
stipulation that gives meaning’ (Ball, Forthcoming: 13-14, original emphasis). Thus the 
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liberal way in which we now use the term ‘marriage’ in part determines the meaning that the 
term ‘marriage’ had all along. Similarly, whether Haslanger’s revisionary analysis of the term 
‘woman’ (cf. Haslanger 2012) correctly captures what we currently mean by the term 
‘woman’ depends, ultimately, on whether her analysis is accepted, on reflection, in the future. 
This second, temporal externalist claim is to be accepted in preference to what Ball sees as 
the only alternative once we reject the subject-change view. That is, rejecting the subject-
change view leaves us, according to Ball, with only two options. Either the facts that fix 
meaning must be in place at the beginning of a discourse, or the facts that fix meaning can be 
determined by the discourse itself. This is why he says: ‘it looks like we have a choice of 
preferring our views prior to inquiry or our views after inquiry: but surely (other things 
equal) our views after inquiry are to be preferred’ (Ball, Forthcoming: 16, original emphasis). 
Ball is, of course, right that our views after inquiry are to be preferred. This is because 
our views after inquiry are more likely to reflect the true nature of the properties about which 
we think and talk. But this does not mean that our views after inquiry should be taken to 
determine the topics about which we think and talk. As with Cappelen’s view, this is to fall 
back into a descriptivist account of reference. Stipulations made on the basis of agreement 
after rational reflection will always in principle be open to challenge, no matter how much 
evidence has been gathered in their favour. Why, after all, couldn’t future members of our 
linguistic community be collectively mistaken? Some properties and kinds are what they are, 
and are not made so by any agreement we may collectively reach, whether now or in the 
future, even after we have reflected for an indefinite amount of time on all the evidence 
available to us. The possibility of communal error remains, but it is ruled out by fiat on both 
Cappelen’s view and on Ball’s. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that conceptual engineering in the narrow sense is to be explained by appeal to 
the externalist distinction between concepts and conceptions. If a concept is determined by 
non-conceptual relations to an objective property, rather than by associated communal 
conceptions, topic preservation through semantic change will be possible. The level of 
objectivity required for topic preservation through semantic change is guaranteed by the mere 
possibility of collective error and does not depend on a stronger level of objectivity, such as 
mind-independence or independence from linguistic or social practice more generally. This 
means that the requisite level of objectivity is exhibited not only by natural kinds, but also by 
a wide range of philosophical kinds, social kinds and artefactual kinds. Alternative accounts 
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that fail to distinguish language from thought thereby fail to do justice to this basic level of 
objectivity, and subsequently fail adequately to explain the phenomenon of conceptual 
engineering in the narrow sense. 
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